Tea And Sympathy

British industrial relations are traditionally voluntarist. They centre on collective bargaining and the voluntary regulation of the employment relationship. Workers' representatives usually negotiate pay and conditions on behalf of staff though employee involvement can vary greatly. There are usually two or more parties with different opinions of what the outcome should be and they are most often management and employees often represented by a trade union. Research into negotiations has tended to focus on the negotiations themselves rather than the contexts. During negotiations negotiators arrive at key decision points at which they must decide what to do. Behaviours are usually competitive or collaborative. One is distributive in that one side's gain is the others side's loss, whereas integrative bargaining tries to increase the overall rewards for all. The most effective negotiators show some concern for the other parties as well as their own (Arnold, Cooper and Robertson, 1998).

Choice of management style affects strategies and practices. Management strategies might be inclusive or exclusive of unions. Other dimensions such as status and contract or high and low strategic integration and individualism/collectivism can be added to give matrices of different styles. Collaborative arrangements appear to perform well but the political climate can affect the choice of styles (McLoughlin and Gourlay, 1992 and Hyman, 1997 in Bratton and Gold, 1999). Trade unions have several responses to these developments: opposition, passive co-operation, a bargaining approach and partnership (Bratton and Gold, 1999). The newer HRM models are inconsistent with traditional industrial relations models involving trade unions.

There are more options than conceding or not conceding. It is as well to remember that it may be necessary to work with the other parties again in the future so maintaining a good relationship and listening to them may be important. Willingness to compromise shows concern for the other party. Negotiations are often necessary in disputes over pay and conditions not least over working time, rest periods, breaks and holidays. The voluntarist tradition has been circumscribed in recent years by government legislation and European Directives. The negotiations over the Working Time Directive carried out in the European Parliament, for example, required several amendments and derogations had to be negotiated for many different sectoral interests.

The Working Time Directive of the European Union sets out the hours of work for employees within the European Union. Council Directive 93/104/EC, of 23 November 1993, amended by Directive 2000/34/EC of 22 June 2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council is concerned with hours of work, rest periods, breaks and paid holidays and night work in respect of health and safety. In particular it sets down a minimum of 11 hours rest in every 24 hours, a day off every seven days, a break every six hours as determined by collective or social agreements or legislation, four weeks annual paid holiday, a maximum 48 hour week including overtime. Also night work periods should be no more than eight hours in any 24 hour period with free health checks available. There is a general principle of adapting work to man especially where the work is monotonous with quick repetition. Derogations are allowed for continuity of service or production, such as in hospitals, agriculture or press and information services.

A satisfactory outcome to negotiations is obviously preferable. Failing to arrive at a settlement is usually unacceptable to all. Coming away with an unsatisfactory one-sided arrangement is also unacceptable and it may be necessary for the negotiator to persuade the rest of the team that what they came away with is acceptable (Arnold, Cooper and Robertson, 1998).

There is no single strategy that can be adopted for negotiations over workers pay and conditions. The traditional voluntarist method is being eroded by legislation from the government and Europe and also by changes in trade unions structures, bargaining power and relationship with New Labour. The hard HRM model threatens further union decline leaving the possibility that the soft HRM model may be a way to find mutually beneficial arrangments in future (Bratton and Gold, 1999). After all, we all want our tea breaks and our holidays.